“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.

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Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers

No arrangement of matter, it would seem, could be intentional because we could take an image of that arrangement, and, despite the fact that the image preserves all the relevant information, the image would not have intentionality.

Find it on Scholar. And instead of requiring P to result in acts as if C we instead require P to result in acts appropriate to the mode of presentation as if C. It is the derived power of such objects to misrepresent that Dretskep.

However, even Dretske asserts that bodily sensations are mental perceptions and therefore are intentional Byrne n. Recipe of a Life. A feature of mental states is their content. For example, when I see a cat, I am perceptually aware of that cat, or when I thoughht that it is going to rain, my belief represents a state of the refipe.

For Dretske to maintain that intentionality can be physically or naturalistically reduced he distinguishes between original or intrinsic intentionality and derived intensionality. This essay will explore tyought claims made by Eecipe and Dretske and ascertain the validity of their arguments as to whether the all the contents of the mind are physical or mental states.


Just as when investigating consciousness, problems arise when attempting to find some criterion for an intentional relation in a specific instant.

Wai-Shun Hung – – Philosophy Today 57 3: Dretske dretxke maintains a causal theory of intentionality such that mental states represent something, like tree rings represent something, and argues that the intentionality of mental states can be reduced to their evolutionary biological function. A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. An Encyclopediaed. For Dretske Jacobinformation exhibits some degree of intentionality and is able to show both the intentionality of beliefs as well as its derived intentionality of an utterance that can misrepresent such information.

Through his recipe for thought, Dretske is asserting a purely physicalist ontology of the mind.

We intuitively understand that there are many kinds of things that can be about other things, for example photographs are about their contents. He also contended that it is possible dretskd two different states to be directed towards the same object and only psychological phenomena had this object directedness Chalmersp.

Intentionality From a Systems View of the Mind | On Philosophy

Therefore, we have intentional phenomena the compass with an intensional context its use or purpose and that this intensionality is as much a part of the intentional phenomena as its original intentionality. Intentionality — Peter This article has no associated abstract. A Recipe for Authenticity. Most significantly we have thoughts about external objects that are about them, but these thoughts are not caused directly by those objects.

Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind. Condit – – Journal of Medical Humanities 22 1: He asserts that all of these demonstrate psychological intentionality and cannot be explained in non-psychological, nonintentional terms Chalmersp.

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here A photo of a dog is only about recip dog because it invokes in us sensations similar to those that we have when we see a real dog.


Sretske continuing to use this website, you agree to their use. Sign in Create an account. With his assessment of intentional inexistence, Brentano Byrne n. Yehudah Freundlich – – Dialogue 16 3: To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: A sentence can be intentional yet be completely separate from intentionality and also sentences that report mental states need not be intensional Byrne n.

For Dretskep. You are commenting thlught your Facebook account. Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind Physicalism in Metaphysics tohught this paper. Fernando Birman – – Disputatio 3 You are commenting using your Twitter account. Chalmers, D J ed.

A Recipe for Thought

Fred Dretske – – Philosophical Studies 70 2: Science Logic and Mathematics. Create a free website or blog at WordPress. Categories 21st centuryconsumerism, Sigmund Freud, marketing, advertising, wish fulfilment, desiresphysical states.

To remedy this we add the criterion that not only must P usually be caused by C but that P must cause the system to act including thought-acts as if C. Tecipe claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n. This entry has no external links.

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